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One of the principal dangers currently facing the world economy 
arises from the large and unsustainable imbalances in current 
account  positions.  Some  observers  argue  that  these  imbal-
ances will unwind gradually and nondisruptively, while others 
emphasize the risks of a sudden change of sentiment in financial 
markets that could result in an abrupt and damaging adjustment. 
No one knows which scenario will materialize, but a priority 
for policymakers should be to reduce the risks of a crisis, which 
could produce a world recession and disruptions to the global 
trading system. For that, the global economy requires official 
sponsorship of a credible, comprehensive adjustment program. 
This policy brief outlines such a program.
Section 1 presents why the current situation is unsustain-
able. Adjustment must take place and will require significant 
movements in exchange rates. Section 2 argues that adjustment 
induced by policy actions is more likely to be orderly than one 
initiated by financial markets. We view the current stalemate 
regarding policy actions as dangerous, as financial-market partic-
ipants are likely to change their minds at some stage about the 
sustainability of imbalances unless they see that the main players 
are able to agree on the direction of desirable policy changes. 
Section 3 presents estimates of the exchange rate implications 
of global current account adjustment from a variety of models. 
Section 4 describes the policy implications the authors of this 
brief drew from these results and the workshop discussions.
WHY THE CURRENT SITUATION 
IS UNSUSTAINABLE
There has been a great deal of discussion recently of global current 
account imbalances. Much of the attention has focused on the 
historically large US current account deficit, which, according to 
the US Bureau of Economic Analysis, reached $857 billion (6.5 
percent of GDP) in 2006. The counterpart to this deficit can be 
found mainly in Asia and the oil-exporting countries. Accord-
ing to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s surplus 
swelled to an estimated $184 billion (7.2 percent of GDP) in 
2006,1 while Japan recorded an estimated surplus of $167 billion 
(3.7 percent of GDP) last year. High oil prices propelled the 
surplus for countries in the Middle East to $282 billion last 
year. 
1. This estimate appears conservative. China’s trade surplus in goods was $178 
billion in 2006, with imports reported on a cost, insurance, freight (c.i.f) basis. 
When the import data are adjusted to free on board (f.o.b.), the trade in goods 
surplus will likely come in at about $215 billion. Based on trends in the other 
items in the first-half balance of payments, Nicholas Lardy estimates that China’s 
surplus last year was $240 billion (see Nicholas Lardy,  Toward a Consumption-
Driven Growth Path, Policy Briefs in International Economics PB06-6, Washing-
ton: Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2006).
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From early in its existence, the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics has occasionally produced estimates of the funda-
mental equilibrium exchange rates (FEERs) of major currencies. 
We have long felt that there would be value in regularly produc-
ing such numbers, so that observers had a metric with which to
judge ongoing changes in exchange rates but were deterred from 
producing  such  estimates  by  the  difficulties  and  expense  in-
volved in making estimates of FEERs in the absence of a work-
ing model. There are, of course, floating fundamentalists who 
regard such an exercise as superfluous, because the market is by 
definition always right. 
      But there are also those who believe that markets can and 
do at times err. Some of those who believe this also believe that 
markets would be less liable to err if there were informed public 
debates, such as we seek to stimulate with this policy brief, about 
the appropriateness of current rates. Since we now have a tool that 
permits regular calculation of estimates of equilibrium exchange 
rates, we have decided to exploit it.
The first part of this policy brief reminds readers of the nature 
of the FEER. Since it is defined as the (real, effective) exchange 
rate that will achieve specified medium-term objectives for the 
economy, the next task is to describe and justify the assumptions 
that are made. These are of two types: assumptions of what would 
happen if there were no exchange rate changes and assumptions 
about the policy objectives that are being pursued. The object is 
to calculate exchange rate changes consistent with achievement of 
those objectives. We then describe briefly the nature of the model 
we employ to translate objectives into exchange rate outcomes. 
(The model is presented more fully in Cline 2008.) The final and 
most substantive section of the paper presents and discusses the 
new results.
These results, of course, depend on both normative judg-
ments and specific measures of likely changes in current account 
balances in response to exchange rate changes. However, the 
transparency with which the calculations are presented should 
allow for others to make their own evaluations. They are our 
estimates of what would be needed in order to achieve specified 
macroeconomic outcomes. 
We are well aware that neither the outcomes specified nor 
the assumptions about what would happen at constant exchange 
rates nor the model used to estimate the exchange rate implica-
tions of the outcomes specified are beyond challenge. But we are 
also convinced that debate about where exchange rates ought to 
be needs to start by someone laying out their ideas on paper. 
We hope that those who disagree with our conclusions will 
explain their disagreements by pinpointing the specific part of 
the analysis that they find lacking, so that we may benefit from 
the criticisms and be able to make better estimates in the future.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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The ConCepT of The feeR
One of the authors of this policy brief introduced the concept 
of the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate in one of the 
early publications of the Institute for International Economics 
(Williamson 1983). The term was chosen to emphasize that 
one was seeking the obverse of an exchange rate in “funda-
mental disequilibrium” in the Bretton Woods sense. Hence a 
FEER involved an exchange rate that is indefinitely sustainable 
on the basis of existing policies. It should be one expected to 
generate a current account surplus or deficit that matched the 
country’s underlying capital flow over the cycle, assuming that 
the country is pursuing internal balance as best as it can and 
that it is not restricting trade for balance-of-payments reasons. 
In a growing world where demand for reserves is increasing 
over time, one needs to include the secular growth of reserve 
holdings as part of the capital flow that is to be financed by the 
current account surplus (or deduct the desired reserve increase 
from the capital inflow that permits a current account deficit).
Few countries now restrict trade for balance-of-payments 
reasons. Similarly, the dominant view that demand pressure 
drives the acceleration rather than the level of inflation pretty 
much removes choice about what is meant by internal balance. 
In contrast, the widespread advent of high capital mobility 
has made it far more difficult to definitively pin down what 
is meant by a country’s “underlying capital flow.” An extreme 
view would be that any level of current account imbalance can 
be financed by an endogenous capital flow, making it impos-
sible to define a FEER. We believe that this goes altogether 
too far and that one can still identify dangerously large capi-
tal inflows (i.e., borrowing) and economically unproductive 
capital outflows (lending, including reserve buildups). There 
is nevertheless a range of indeterminacy: Within some limits, 
capital flows and therefore current accounts may vary without 
inducing forces that tend to curtail the flows. Limits lie at the 
edges of this range of indeterminacy, and it is desirable to work 
toward a situation in which the limits are respected. We adopt 
this position in our study, as will be evident when we discuss 
the appropriate set of current account targets.
Naturally a FEER is defined in real (inflation-adjusted) 
terms. If a country suffers 10 percent higher inflation than its 
peers, then its currency will have to depreciate by 10 percent 
in order to restore the same real position as before. Only then 
will its producers have their competitive position restored and 
will its consumers face the same choices as before. Similarly 
the relevant exchange rate concept is an effective rate—i.e., one 
where the myriad foreign currencies are all taken into account 
and weighted (by their importance in the foreign trade of the 
country concerned) to form a single estimate of the exchange 
rate. The practice of measuring a currency’s value in terms of 
the currency of a single trading partner and calling this “the” 
exchange rate is quite wrong for a country with reasonably 
diversified trade. This is a bilateral rate, in contrast to the 
effective  rate,  which  gives  a  measure  of  a  country’s  overall 
competitive position. (None of this is to deny that many other 
factors such as productivity also influence competitiveness, 
which are implicitly being held constant in the analysis of 
exchange rates.)
AssumpTions
As stated above, it is natural to break down the assumptions 
into two types. One is a projection about what would occur if 
no exchange rate changes were made. The other assumptions 
relate to the policy objectives that are being, or ought to be, 
sought by macroeconomic policy. 
The  projections  come  directly  from  the  International 
Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook (IMF 2008a). 
In principle, it might be better to use the longest projections 
published by the Fund, for the year 2013, on the ground that 
these would build in a return of output levels to their cyclically 
normal positions and would allow time for the effects of past 
exchange rate changes to work their way through the system. 
However, for almost all countries except Russia, the IMF is 
projecting that there would be no further significant changes 
in current account positions on the basis of existing policies. 
This vitiates the value of using a distant projection, which is 
intended to recognize further changes that seem likely to occur 
on the basis of present policies and with existing real exchange 
rates. For example, the IMF is projecting mild cycling of the 
Brazilian current account deficit in the out years, rather than 
the progressive deterioration that we believe to be likely with 
the present real value of the real. It, therefore, seems to us pref-
erable to use their projections for 2009, which are more solidly 
based than those for 2013 can hope to be. In the future it is 
conceivable that we will be in a position to add assumptions 
regarding the elimination of cyclical slack, or adopt our own 
projections for the progressive change in current account posi-
tions that seem likely on the basis of existing exchange rates, 
but we have made no such assumptions of our own in this 
instance. Hence if the United States suffers a more severe slow-
down than most other countries in 2008–09, and if the US 
current account deficit is being projected as abnormally small 
on account of this fact, then our procedures imply that we will 
underestimate the dollar depreciation needed to achieve the 
objectives specified.
The  April  2008  World  Economic  Outlook  was  prepared 
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is why we have estimated the bilateral dollar exchange rates 
consistent with achievement of all FEERs as changes in dollar 
exchange rates compared with the rates of February 2008.
We assume that all countries target employment at its natu-
ral rate. But this is not the same as assuming that they always 
hit it. The forecasts used in projecting balance-of-payments 
outcomes on present policies may assume that some countries 
are in for a long spell of high unemployment. If unemployment 
is being deliberately sought in order to reduce inflation to an 
acceptable target, then one might still want to classify a coun-
try as being in internal balance. But if the high unemployment 
results from a failure to stimulate demand sufficiently, then in 
principle one would wish to allow for this in calculating the 
equilibrium exchange rate. In practice we have not changed the 
IMF projections to attempt to do this at the present time. 
It is widely believed that there are two major causes of the 
current external imbalances in the world economy. One is the 
recent increases in oil prices, which have caused large surpluses 
in  most  of  the  oil-exporting  countries  and  correspondingly 
large deficits in the oil-importing countries. The other is the 
large imbalance between a number of East Asian countries on 
the one hand and a number of other countries, primarily the 
United States, on the other. The central case of our analysis is 
focused on the second of these problems and not the first. 
We do not believe that it is fruitful to attempt to esti-
mate the equilibrium exchange rates of the currencies of the 
oil exporters, represented in our group of countries by Saudi 
Arabia, Norway, Russia, and Venezuela. These depend nega-
tively upon their saving strategies and positively on the oil 
price. Saving strategies vary enormously from one country to 
another, from a country like Norway that saves virtually all of 
an increment in the oil price to one like Ecuador that spends 
virtually everything and will face difficulties if and when the 
oil price falls. The world has to find a way of accommodating 
countries like Norway, since such savings reflect the transfor-
mation of exhaustible natural resource wealth into wealth in 
the form of foreign assets. If exchange rate targeting came to 
be viewed as a way of trying to cajole oil exporters into acting 
contrary  to  their  enlightened  long-run  interest  and  forcing 
them into excessive adjustment, their reluctance to participate 
would be well-merited. A likely reaction would be a decision to 
keep more oil in the ground and sell less on the world market. 
Nevertheless, there is a view that the oil exporters should be 
subjected to similar disciplines as other countries irrespective 
of the consequences, so we report a simulation in which they 
are assigned targets similar to other countries.
The  other  critical  variable  is  the  oil  price,  which  has 
already (as of late May) risen by over 40 percent from the $95 
per barrel assumed by the IMF in the exercise that forms the 
basic projection of this study. Since many of the oil export-
ers will ultimately spend much of their additional receipts, 
the equilibrium real exchange rates of most of the oil export-
ers have risen in consequence. We have two reasons for not 
attempting to estimate by how much. First, this would depend 
on a reasonable extrapolation of the oil price, which neither we 
nor anyone else is currently in a position to make. (Attempts 
to keep up with the latest numbers would threaten us with 
apoplexy.)  Second,  estimating  equilibrium  exchange  rates 
would demand estimates of the saving strategies of each oil 
exporter identified in this study. That would at the least require 
detailed knowledge of each country, which we do not claim to 
possess. We believe that it is better to restrict our task to that of 
estimating the equilibrium exchange rates of other countries, 
in the belief that these estimates are reasonably independent 
of the oil price.
None of this is to doubt that the policy of many oil export-
ers of pegging their currencies to the dollar is questionable, 
or that the IMF’s endorsement of this policy is misguided. As 
Brad Setser argued in his policy brief 07-8 for the Peterson 
Institute (Setser 2007), most of these countries would benefit 
both themselves and the world economy if they either floated 
their exchange rates or pegged them to a basket that contained 
both the currencies from which they buy their imports and the 
oil price.1 This would not necessarily increase the total amount 
of adjustment that occurs (which should not be our aim), but 
it would make adjustment both more rapid and more focused 
on changes in the income and spending of the private sector. 
Perhaps most important, it would enable adjustment to an 
increased oil price to occur without the inevitable side product 
of inflation, which is implied by a dollar peg.
The most important determinant of a non-oil-exporting 
area’s equilibrium exchange rate is its current account target. 
We started from a presumption that in general, imbalances 
should not exceed 3 percent of GDP in the intermediate run. 
This has become a standard figure, so the first justification for 
using it is to prevent our conclusions from being based on 
assumptions that are at variance with conventional wisdom. 
But one should also ask whether its adoption as conventional 
wisdom was solidly based. The answer is that there is at least a 
1. However, simulations suggest that the 50 percent weight on the oil price 
mentioned by Setser would have been far too high. A reasonable value might 
in our view fall in the range of 10 to 15 percent.
The most important determinant 
of a non-oil-exporting area’s 
equilibrium exchange rate is 
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rule of thumb with a modicum of statistical support to justify 
the contention that most countries should not accept deficits 
exceeding 3 percent of GDP except on a transitory basis.2 If 
one does not wish the burden of adjustment to fall overwhelm-
ingly on deficit countries, then one needs to make sure that a 
roughly symmetrical rule applies to surplus countries.
Given the 3 percent rule, we can classify in the following 
ways the 30 nonoil countries whose FEERs we are seeking to 
establish:
1.  Eight countries that have projected 2009 deficits in excess 
of 3 percent of GDP, which we assume should be reduced to 
3 percent. These countries are Colombia, Hungary, India, 
Poland, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Counting Hungary, Poland, and Turkey 
as developing countries, six of these eight countries are 
developing countries, in which we regard it as appropriate 
to run moderate current account deficits. The remaining 
two are the large Anglo-Saxon chronic-deficit countries, in 
which a more ambitious target than a 3 percent of GDP 
deficit at present appears unrealistic.
2.  Four economies that have projected 2009 deficits less than 
3 percent of GDP, which we have reduced to a target of 
zero. Three of these, Korea (arguably) and the euro area 
and Canada (indisputably), are industrial economies. We 
subscribe to the traditional view that it is fundamentally a 
distortion in the international economy for capital to flow 
“uphill” from developing to industrial countries, so we 
suggest they should target zero for that reason and because 
they are clearly capable of achieving that objective. The 
remaining country is Argentina, which seems unlikely to 
be able to finance much of a deficit in the future in the 
2. For emerging-market economies, Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) 
statistically identify 40 percent as a critical threshold for external debt relative 
to GDP, beyond which countries have tended to be vulnerable to default. Ex-
ternal debt stabilizes at a debt to GDP ratio that equals the ratio of the current 
account deficit as a percent of GDP to the nominal growth rate of GDP in 
foreign currency. With emerging-market growth rates typically in the range of 
4 to 5 percent and world inflation at 2½ percent in dollars or euros, nominal 
GDP growth in foreign currency is typically on the order of 7 percent. Forty 
percent of this growth rate is about 3 percent, so the critical debt to GDP 
ratio translates into a current account deficit of about 3 percent of GDP. For 
industrial countries, Freund (2000) found that reversals of deficits tend to 
begin at a threshold of 5 percent of GDP and involve a slowdown in growth 
in the adjustment period. Mann (1999, 156) identifies 17 episodes in which 
widening current account deficits of industrial countries were reversed in the 
1980s and 1990s; the average ratio of the current account deficit to GDP was 
4.5 percent when the reversal began (although she indicates that the turning 
points were not necessarily thresholds of unsustainability). For the important 
case of the United States, Cline (2005, 172–74) argues that 3 percent of GDP 
is a prudent long-term ceiling for the current account deficit despite past 
advantages of higher return on foreign assets than liabilities and favorable valu-
ation effects from exchange rate changes. Williamson (2004, 30) and Mussa 
(2005, 189) set the ceiling at 2 to 2.5 percent of GDP.
light of its record of unilaterally renouncing debt contracts 
when these become inconvenient.
3.  Four developing countries, mostly Latin American (Mexi-
co, Brazil, Chile, and the Czech Republic), that have a 
2009  projected  deficit  of  less  than  3  percent  of  GDP, 
whose target we assume should be to remain the same. 
This is a reflection of our belief that it is wrong to oblige 
countries to adjust when they have no need to and that it 
is appropriate and conducive to good resource allocation 
for developing countries (within reason) to run deficits 
and borrow. 
4.  Two  resource-intensive  countries  in  deficit  that  appear 
to prefer larger deficits than 3 percent and have demon-
strated  that  they  are  capable  of  managing  large  debts. 
We have doubled the allowable deficit for Australia and 
New Zealand to 6 percent on these grounds. But we still 
believe that prudence demands that they not allow their 
debts to explode as would certainly result from even larger 
deficits.3 
5.  Four developing countries (Indonesia, Thailand, Philip-
pines, and Israel) with projected 2009 surpluses of less 
than 3 percent of GDP, which we have given a target of 
zero. The reasons are symmetrical with those cited for 
group 2.
6.  Two countries (Singapore and Switzerland) that have for 
many years run large surpluses, as part of a rational strat-
egy of optimal accumulation, to which we have assigned 
a target surplus of 6 percent of GDP in symmetry with 
group 4. We accept that these countries would face major 
difficulties in adjusting if they were expected to follow the 
same rules as other countries, and that saving is a social 
virtue, but it is also true that saving can be so large as to 
inflict deflation on trading partners. The suggested targets 
represent a compromise between alternative views of what 
is socially responsible.4
This set of categories and country conditions provides 
targets for 24 economies. For reasons mentioned earlier, we 
3. Moreover, one of us has argued that New Zealand’s net international liabili-
ties, at 92 percent of GDP, are already precariously high, especially given its 
higher rate of return paid on external liabilities than earned on external assets 
(Cline 2006, IMF 2008b).
4.  Switzerland has an unusual structure of assets and liabilities, which partially 
explains its flow balance of payments figures. Large multinational firms based 
in Switzerland are principally owned by foreigners. The reinvested earnings 
of these corporations are included in the current account, but the result is an 
appreciation in the stock market value of the corporations and the foreign 
component of that does not get registered in the current account as a debit 
item. No similar simple explanation is available for Singapore, which shows a 
deficit in its investment income on the balance of payments despite its massive 
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have resolved not to formulate targets for the four oil exporters 
in the central case (although we do so in one of the three vari-
ant scenarios considered). The remaining task is to formulate 
targets for the other six economies: China, Hong Kong, Japan, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Sweden, all of which are economies with 
a major surplus exceeding 3 percent of GDP. The preceding 
suggestions call for an aggregate net reduction in deficits of 
$351 billion (deficit reductions of $429 billion, led by the 
United States with $170 billion and the euro area with $120 
billion; and surplus reductions of $78 billion, led by Singapore 
and Switzerland with about $30 billion each). If one imposes 
the condition that the rest of world (RoW) imbalance not be 
affected by the adjustment program (because one surely does 
not want to require countries to adjust simply because they 
were not individually identified), the six preceding adjusters 
have to reduce their surpluses by a collective $351 billion. The 
collective excess of their surpluses over 3 percent of GDP is 
$430 billion. Hence the target of each is a reduction in their 
surplus of 351/430 x (the excess of their projection over 3 
percent of GDP).
This method is most comparable to the first methodol-
ogy expounded by Lee et al. (2008) in their description of 
the three methodologies employed by the IMF’s Consultative 
Group on Exchange Rate Issues (CGER) to assess equilibrium 
exchange  rates.  This  first  methodology,  which  they  call  the 
Macroeconomic Balance Approach, differs in two important 
ways from that we use. First, we use a judgmental rather than 
an econometric approach to determine current account targets. 
Second, we use standard rather than estimated country-specific 
responses of the trade balance to the real exchange rate.
So far as the first difference is concerned, they use an esti-
mated equation with arguments of fiscal balance, demograph-
ics, net foreign assets (NFAs), oil balance, economic growth, 
economic crises, and whether a country is a financial center 
to determine the current account targets for 54 advanced and 
emerging-market countries. It is inevitable that the staff of an 
international organization will seek to use a formula rather 
than judgment in such a sensitive exercise. The judgment that 
we use is, of course, constrained by what seems reasonable in 
the light of factors such as those used in the IMF’s estimat-
ing equation. We nevertheless chose a judgmental approach 
for three reasons. First, we were in no position to estimate a 
full econometric equation of the type employed by the IMF. 
Second,  we  believe  it  to  be  important  to  treat  comparable 
countries equivalently, and unless the IMF has chosen exactly 
the right variables to include in its estimating equation (and 
has estimated the true coefficients), this treatment will not be 
guaranteed by the IMF approach. In this context, inclusion of 
an economy’s oil balance as a determinant of its current account 
target appears particularly dubious, although it surely improves 
the goodness of fit of an estimated equation explaining current 
account balances. Third, we do not agree that the results of the 
IMF equation make normative sense. These results average to 
a balance of +0.3 percent of GDP for advanced economies in 
Europe, –1.9 percent of GDP for all other advanced economies 
(dominated by the United States), +1.3 percent of GDP for 
emerging-market economies in Asia, –0.3 percent for Latin 
America, and –2.8 percent for Central and Eastern Europe (Lee 
et al. 2008, 7). But surely it is hardly normative for the Asian 
emerging-market  economies  to  be  running  sizable  current 
account surpluses rather than receiving net capital inflows for 
development any more than it should be seen as normative for 
advanced economies outside Europe to be running deficits and 
absorbing capital from the developing world.
So far as the second difference is concerned, we have neither 
access to a compendium of country-specific elasticities nor the 
capacity to estimate such elasticities ourselves. We suspect the 
uncertainties involved in estimating elasticities are such as to 
give the IMF approach a minimal advantage.
The second method employed by the IMF is an equilib-
rium real exchange rate approach (also known among prac-
titioners as a “behavioral effective exchange rate” or BEER), 
while the third aims for a current account balance that would 
stabilize  NFAs  as  a  proportion  of  GDP  at  an  appropriate 
level. We do not pursue a BEER approach and have critiqued 
it as a guide to FEERs on grounds, among others, that such 
estimates must assume that on average all countries were in 
fundamental equilibrium during the estimation period (Cline 
and Williamson 2008). As for the NFA approach, in practice 
the appropriate level is interpreted by the IMF as the 2006 
level (2006 was the latest year for which complete data were 
available). In one of our alternative simulations we adopt the 
aim of stabilizing NFA/GDP at its projected 2009 level.5 As 
5. We calculate these based on the 2006 NFA estimates available in IMF 
(2008b), by adding cumulative current account balances in 2007–09 as pro-
jected in IMF (2008a). For the United States, specific estimates are developed 
based on the model discussed in Cline (2005). These involve significant gains 
from exchange rate valuation effects in 2007 and 2008. The same study is the 
The US dollar remains somewhat 
overvalued on a multilateral 
basis. A further decline in its 
value will be needed to restore 
equilibrium, even defining 
equilibrium to be a 3 percent of 
GDP deficit in the current account. N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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the IMF study concedes (Lee et al. 2008, 15–16), there is little 
normative content to this objective since it may be optimal to 
raise or lower the level of NFA/GDP, but the method does have 
the virtue of ruling out Ponzi strategies.6
In addition to the central case described above, we run 
three other simulations of the model described below. The first 
uses the same set of current account objectives as described 
above but assumes that the trade elasticities are higher (the 
“high-elasticities variant”) in order to shrink the global current 
account discrepancy that otherwise emerges in the realignment 
solution. The second attempts to apply the same set of rules to 
the four of our countries described by the IMF as fuel export-
ers, namely Saudi Arabia, Norway, Russia, and Venezuela. The 
latter two are unaffected because they have projected imbal-
ances of less than 3 percent of GDP, but it is assumed that both 
Saudi Arabia and Norway should aim to reduce their surpluses 
to 6 percent of GDP, the same as Singapore and Switzerland. 
The third variant simulation represents an attempt to apply 
the IMF’s last approach. It adjusts current accounts from their 
2009 baselines to levels needed to stabilize NFA/GDP ratios at 
their 2009 levels. In our NFA variant, however, the oil-export-
ing economies are once again exempted from the general rule. 
The sets of current account targets and figures relevant to their 
derivation are shown in table 1.
nATuRe of The model employed
This section summarizes the features of the symmetric matrix 
inversion method (SMIM) model developed in Cline (2008) 
to calculate FEERs for 34 economies. This method is symmet-
ric in that it gives equal weight to each country in arriving at 
the realignment to FEERs, rather than requiring exact achieve-
ment of the adjustment target for the United States and then 
solving for partner exchange rate changes consistent with this 
requirement and also as consistent as possible with the other 
current account targets.7 The model is based on two sets of rela-
tionships. The first is economic: The current account depends 
on the real effective exchange rate.8 The second is essentially 
source for the NFA estimate for Taiwan (p. 23). The estimate for Saudi Arabia 
is for the country’s sovereign wealth fund (Truman 2008).
6. In which deficits or surpluses could continue to widen without limit.
7.  In two earlier approaches that may be designated US-centric instead of 
symmetric, Cline (2005) used an optimization algorithm and Cline (2007) 
used a matrix inversion method for this purpose. 
8. This relationship focuses on the relative price or “elasticity” effect in 
determination of trade. A parallel shadow “absorption” effect must also be 
consistent, involving the national accounts identity whereby net imports equal 
investment minus saving (including public). Implicitly the focus on the effec-
tive exchange rate in external-sector adjustment assumes that parallel influ-
ences on domestic demand, such as a fiscal adjustment, take place to facilitate 
external adjustment and maintain the economy at full capacity.
algebraic: The change in the effective exchange rate is a weight-
ed average of changes in bilateral exchange rates. Realignment 
of bilateral exchange rates to arrive at FEERs must obey this 
consistency relationship in coming as close as possible to the 
desired set of changes in effective exchange rates.
The economic relationship states that the change in the 
current  account  as  a  percent  of  GDP  will  be  equal  to  the 
percentage change in the effective exchange rate, multiplied 
by a country-specific impact parameter. The impact parameter 
equals the export price elasticity multiplied by the share of 
exports in GDP. Ideally, export elasticities would be specially 
tailored for each economy, for example, to reflect idiosyncra-
sies of greater or lesser exchange rate responsiveness (includ-
ing, for example, influences of product composition as well as 
exchange rate pass through) of the economy’s principal trad-
ing  partners.  In  practical  implementation,  the  export  price 
elasticity is assumed to follow a standard formula set at unity 
for  a  relatively  closed  economy  with  exports  amounting  to 
10 percent of GDP and falling to 0.5 (because of increasing 
supply constraints) for a highly open economy with exports 
equal to 100 percent of GDP or more.9 A variant using high 
elasticities was also explored, in an effort to narrow the global 
current account discrepancy from an increase of $122 billion 
in the central case. Increasing the elasticities to 1.5 for the rela-
tively closed economy and 0.75 for the highly open economy, 
thus increasing the impact parameters for all countries except 
the United States (for which a model-specific value is used), 
realignment generates an increase of only $45 billion in the 
global current account discrepancy.
9. Absence of change on the imports side is premised on a price elasticity 
of unity for imports, which means that the local currency value of imports 
does not change, and both the volume and dollar value of imports change 
in proportion to the strength of the local currency against the dollar. In the 
case of oil, exports are not sensitive to price so the adjustment of economies 
that export only oil takes place exclusively on the import side. (For them, the 
parameters used here imply an import price elasticity of about 2.) For the 
United States, the estimates use an impact parameter derived from a much 
more complete model and include capital income effects from cumulative 
changes in net foreign liabilities.
The dollar has been overstrong for 
many years (as a result of which the 
United States has changed from the 
world’s largest net creditor to its 
largest debtor), a disequilibrium 
that our method assumes needs 
to be reduced to a prudent level.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                     J u l y   2 0 0 8
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Australia 1,10 –8. –. –0 0.0 0.0 1.
New Zealand 1 –10.8 –.1 –88 1.1 1.1 1.
Asia
China ,0 . 10.0  –. –.9 –.9
Hong Kong 0 0.0 8.  –. –. 8.8
India 1, –.1 –. –11 0. 0. 1.8
Indonesia  . 1. –1 –1. –1. –.8
Japan ,0 198. .9 8 –0.8 0.0 –.
Korea 1,0 –9. –0.9 –0 0.9 0.9 –0.9
Malaysia  . 11.1 1 –. –.0 –11.1
Philippines 18 1.8 1.0 –9 –1.0 –0.9 –.
Singapore 0 8. 18.9 11 –1.9 –1. –11.8
Taiwan   .8 8.1 100 –.1 –.0 –1.
Thailand 9 .9 1. – –1. –1. –.
Middle East/Africa
Israel 18 .1 1. –1 –1. –1. –.
Saudi Arabia 0 11. .0  0.0 –1. 0.0
South Africa 1 –.9 –.9 – .9 .0 .
Europe
Czech Republic  –. –.8 –9 0.0 0.0 0.
Euro area 1,98 –10.8 –0.9 –8 0.9 0.9 0.
Hungary 1 –8. –.1 –91 .1 .1 –1.1
Norway 1 9. 0. 99 0.0 –1. 0.0
Poland 81 –. –. – . . 1.9
Russia ,01 . .9 8 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sweden 1 . . 10 –.0 –0. –8.0
Switzerland  . 1.8 1 –.8 –. –9.
Turkey 8 –.9 –. – . . .
United Kingdom ,990 –11.0 –. – 1. 1. .1
Western Hemisphere
Argentina  –.0 –0.  0. 0. 0.8
Brazil 1,0 –1.0 –0.9 – 0.0 0.0 –0.8
Canada 1, –19.8 –1. – 1. 1. 0.
Chile 1 –. –1. – 0.0 0.0 0.
Colombia 09 –9.1 –. –1 1. 1. 1.
Mexico 988 –1. –1. – 0.0 0.0 –1.0
United States 1, –0. –. – 1. 1. .
Venezuela 9 1.1 .0  0.0 0.0 0.0
Rest of world ,0 19. .9 n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.0
World , 0.1 0. n.a. 0.0 0.0 0.0
n.a. = not available; NFA = net foreign assets
a.  International Monetary Fund forecast for 009 (IMF 008a).
b.  Estimates for 009 (authors’ calculations; see footnote ).N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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The overall effect in the central case is that the impact 
parameter rises from about 0.15 percent of GDP change in 
current account for each percentage point change in the effec-
tive exchange rate for a relatively closed economy to a maxi-
mum of 0.5 percent of GDP per percentage point for a highly 
open economy. In the case of China, for example, the central 
case estimates the impact parameter at 0.3 percent of GDP 
reduction in current account surplus for a 1 percentage point 
appreciation in the effective exchange rate.10 If the target exter-
nal adjustment is a reduction in the current account surplus by 
6 percentage points, the target effective exchange rate apprecia-
tion will need to be 6/(0.3) = 20 percent.
The first step in the analysis, identification of the target 
change in each country’s real effective exchange rate (REER), 
is thus simple. For each country, the change equals the desired 
change in the current account as a percent of GDP, divided 
by the elasticity-based impact parameter. The problem then 
becomes  more  complicated,  however,  when  consistency  is 
imposed on all of the resulting changes in REERs. Changing 
the REER for any given country necessarily changes those of its 
trading partners. The second part of the analysis, then, involves 
a set of algebraic relationships among individual economies’ 
effective exchange rates, and between bilateral and multilateral 
effective exchange rate changes. If a currency appreciates by, say, 
10 percent against the dollar in isolation, its effective apprecia-
tion against all trading partners also equals the bilateral appre-
ciation, or 10 percent. But if other trading partners also appre-
ciate, the home country’s appreciation in effective terms will 
be diminished by an amount that depends on the importance 
of the other appreciating countries as trading partners. This 
influence turns out to be particularly important when consid-
ering possible corrective change in exchange rates in East Asia. 
Bilaterally against the dollar, some of the indicated changes can 
be quite large; but because several regional trading partners also 
show sizable bilateral appreciations against the dollar needed to 
reach adjustment targets, the corresponding effective exchange 
rate changes are typically considerably smaller and thus likely 
not as daunting in policy terms.
The SMIM model solves for a set of bilateral exchange rate 
changes against the dollar that is consistent with a target set of 
changes in effective exchange rates. It turns out that this is the 
solution to a matrix algebra problem, in which the bilateral 
exchange rate changes (in percent), the effective exchange rate 
changes (in percent), and a matrix of trade weights enter the 
equation.11 It also turns out that there is not just one solution 
10. To calculate the effective exchange rate, the importance of each of the 34 
trading partners in the trade turnover (exports plus imports) of a country is 
calculated from a matrix of bilateral trade flows (Cline 2008,  appendix D).
11.  Namely: Z = B-1R, where Z is a vector of bilateral exchange rate changes 
to this problem. With 35 economies, the number considered in 
this study, there are 35 possible alternative solutions. The reason 
is that there are 35 equations for target effective exchange rate 
changes (one for each country, in light of its target current 
account change and impact parameter) but only 34 unknown 
exchange rate changes against the dollar—because the dollar 
cannot change against itself (in the jargon of the exchange rate 
literature, it is the numeraire). Our approach to dealing with 
this problem of “overdetermination” is simply to average the 
alternative possible sets of exchange rate changes.12
ResulTs
The results of the analysis are shown in table 2 for the central 
case. The first column shows the target change in the current 
account  balance  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  reproduced  from 
the final column in table 1. We are, of course, well aware that 
adjustment  usually  takes  longer  than  a  year;  consequently, 
even if all countries succeeded immediately in achieving and 
subsequently  in  maintaining  the  exchange  rates  calculated 
to be equilibria, they would not be expected to achieve the 
desired current account outcomes in 2009. We have neverthe-
less focused on values of 2009 for purposes of analysis.
The next column in table 2 shows how close a simulation 
of the model described in the preceding section came to achiev-
ing the targets laid out. The simulation gives an equal weight 
to all countries in meeting the targets of column (1). It will be 
observed that in these simulations the United States somewhat 
overachieves its needed adjustment. 
Column (3) shows our estimate of the needed changes 
in the multilateral exchange rates in February 2008, derived 
from the target change in the current account and the impact 
parameter. A positive number indicates that the currency of 
the area in question needed to appreciate and thus that the 
against the dollar (percentages), R is a vector of effective exchange rate changes 
(percentages), and B = I – A, where B is the matrix obtained by subtracting the 
trade-weights matrix A from the identity matrix I.
12. With a single exception, for each currency. Of the 35 solutions, the aver-
age for the currency in question is for the 34 equations in which the country 
has been included. The remaining equation omits the direct effective rate 
equation for the country and only obtains the country’s bilateral exchange 
rate change indirectly as needed to generate the set of effective exchange rate 
changes sought for the other countries. The average of the 34 results with own 
country included, or 34OCI, is used as the estimate of the bilateral exchange 
rate change for the country in question, because the one own country ex-
cluded (OCE) result systematically turns out to be unrepresentative. The OCE 
estimate is always lower than the 34OCI average, in some cases absurdly so. 
With the 34OCI estimate in hand for each of the 35 economies’ exchange rate 
change against the dollar (zero, for the dollar), the corresponding set of effec-
tive exchange rate changes is then calculated. Because of the overdetermination 
problem, this estimated consistent set will show divergences from the target 
set of effective exchange rate changes. These divergences are generally small, 
however.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                     J u l y   2 0 0 8
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Table 2    Results of the central simulation
Changes in current account 
as percent of GDP
Change in REER 


















Australia 0.0 0. 0.0 –1. 1.8 0.91 1.0
New Zealand 1.1 1. –. –. . 0.80 0.8
Asia
China –. –. 19. 18. 1. .1 .
Hong Kong –. –.1 8. 8. 9.0 .80 .0
India 0. 0. –.8 –. .1 9. .1
Indonesia –1. –1.0 . . . 9,181 ,90
Japan –0.8 –0. . . 19.0 10. 90.1
Korea 0.9 1.1 –. –. 11. 9 80
Malaysia –. –.1 1. 1. 0. . .
Philippines –1.0 –0. . 1. 18. 0. .
Singapore –1.9 –1. .8 . 1. 1.1 1.00
Taiwan  –.1 –.8 9. 9.0 .0 1. .1
Thailand –1. –0.9 .9 .0 1.9 . .
Middle East/Africa
Israel –1. –1. . . 9. .1 .0
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. 10.1 . .1
South Africa .9 . –1.9 –1. –. . 8.1
Europe
Czech Republic 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. 1. 1. 1.0
Euro area 0.9 1.0 –.0 –. –0. 1. 1.
Hungary .1 . –. –.8 –1.9 18 181
Norway 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. . .9 .8
Poland . .9 –8.0 –8. –.1 . .9
Russia 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. . . .
Sweden –.0 –.8 8. .9 10. . .
Switzerland –.8 –. 1.9 1. .9 1.09 0.88
Turkey . . –1. –1.0 –8. 1.1 1.
United Kingdom 1. 1. –.0 –. –. 1.9 1.91
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0. 0.9 –. –.8 . .1 .0
Brazil 0.0 0. 0.0 –1. .8 1. 1.
Canada 1. 1. –.8 –.1 –1. 1.00 1.0
Chile 0.0 0. 0.0 –1.1 .9  1
Colombia 1. 1. –.8 –.8 –. 1,90 1,9
Mexico 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. .0 10.8 10.
United States 1. 1. –. –8. 0.0 1.00 1.00
Venezuela 0.0 0. 0.0 –0.8 .8 .1 .08
REER = real effective exchange rateN u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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currency was then undervalued. A negative number indicates 
that the currency needed to depreciate, which implies that it 
was overvalued. Column (4) shows how close the simulation 
came to achieving the target laid out in the previous column. 
According to the central simulation, the largest undervalua-
tions are estimated to be those of Singapore (25 percent real 
effective appreciation needed), China (18 percent), Switzer-
land (21 percent), and Malaysia (12 percent), while the largest 
overvaluations are estimated to be those of South Africa (15 
percent  real  effective  depreciation  needed)  and  Turkey  (13 
percent). The United States is estimated to have been still over-
valued on a multilateral basis in February 2008, with 9 percent 
real effective depreciation called for (in the consistent solution, 
overshooting the US target by about 1 percentage point).13 All 
other misalignments are estimated to be in single digits, 18 of 
them of less than 5 percent. 
Three alternative simulations of the exchange rates needed 
to reach FEERs are shown in tables 3 through 5. In the first of 
these, elasticities were assumed to be higher than was assumed 
in the central case. While we doubt that the bulk of the econo-
metric evidence points to such high figures, we have a mark-
edly smaller change in the estimated global current account 
discrepancy in this case. Needed adjustments are (naturally) 
estimated to be rather smaller under this high-elasticities vari-
ant: Singapore’s needed revaluation is estimated at 17 percent, 
that of China is put at 13 percent, Switzerland at 14 percent, 
and Malaysia’s falls to single digits, while the maximum over-
valuations are put at 9 percent effective depreciation needed 
13. Note that although the dollar depreciated by 1.2 percent from February to 
March/April, using the broad real index of the Federal Reserve, by June it had 
rebounded to the same level as in February.
for South Africa and 8 percent each for both Turkey and the 
United States. The second simulation assumes that oil produc-
ers in imbalance should be subjected to the same rules as oil 
importers, so that both Saudi Arabia and Norway are estimated 
to need large revaluations, even with the high import elastici-
ties implicitly assumed. The corollary is, of course, that other 
surplus countries are required to adjust much less. The third 
simulation shows the effect of adopting the IMF’s third objec-
tive, in which each country aims to stabilize the ratio of its net 
international investment position to GDP (NIIP/GDP) at a 
target level, here assumed to be the level that will be reached 
in 2009, based on 2006 levels and IMF forecasts of current 
account outcomes through 2009.
It  turns  out  that  in  the  oil-adjustment  scenario,  the 
reductions in surpluses by Saudi Arabia and Norway would 
be so large (summing to about $160 billion) that five of the 
six high-surplus residual economies would continue to have 
surpluses in excess of 6 percent of GDP if the same residual 
allocation approach were applied as in the central and high-
elasticities cases. As a result, the 6 percent of GDP surplus 
ceiling is imposed in this variant not only on Singapore and 
Switzerland (as before) and on Saudi Arabia and Norway but 
also on China, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Sweden, and Taiwan. 
Because no further surplus reductions would be needed among 
the residual set, Japan’s surplus would remain unchanged at 
about 4 percent of GDP.
The principal difference in the variant imposing the same 
rules of adjustment on the oil producers (table 4) is the large 
effective appreciations of Norway and Saudi Arabia (in the 
range of 40 to 50 percent), despite the generous assumption 
of an import elasticity of about 2, which helps limit their esti-
mated need to revalue. This considerably narrows the size of 
adjustment required for other high-surplus economies, so that 
whereas the real effective appreciation for China is 18 percent 
in the central solution, it is only 13 percent in the oil-adjust-
ment variant.
The most general differences in the patterns of adjustment 
arise in the variant for stabilizing the NFA/GDP ratios (table 
5). The largest swing from the central case is for Hong Kong, 
where an effective depreciation of 18 percent is needed to hold 
the net foreign assets at their extraordinary level of 244 percent 
of GDP, in contrast to an effective appreciation of 8 percent in 
the central case. For the important case of the United States, 
the simulation shows a needed effective depreciation of 16 
percent instead of 9 percent in the central case because a more 
ambitious narrowing of the current account deficit is needed 
to  keep  net  foreign  liabilities  from  rising  above  the  2009 
benchmark of 25 percent of GDP. Other cases of considerably 
larger effective depreciation than in the central case include 
A number of Asian currencies, 
particularly the Chinese renminbi, 
are seriously undervalued and need 
to appreciate strongly, and this 
correction needs to be accompanied by 
appreciations against the dollar by a 
number of other currencies—such as 
the New Zealand dollar and the Korean 
won—that are already somewhat 
too strong on a multilateral basis.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                     J u l y   2 0 0 8
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Table 3    Results of high-elasticities simulation
Changes in current account
as percent of GDP




















Australia 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. 11. 0.91 1.01
New Zealand 1.1 1. –.0 –. .1 0.80 0.8
Asia
China –. –. 1.8 1. . .1 .81
Hong Kong –. –. .8 . 1.8 .80 .0
India 0. 0. –1.9 –.1 . 9. .0
Indonesia –1. –1.1 .9 . 1.8 9,181 ,9
Japan –0.8 –0. . . 1.1 10. 9.1
Korea 0.9 1.0 –1.8 –.0 10.0 9 89
Malaysia –. –. 8.8 8. .1 . .
Philippines –1.0 –0.8 1. 1. 1. 0. .
Singapore –1.9 –1. 1. 1.9 0. 1.1 1.08
Taiwan  –.1 –.0 . . 19.8 1. .
Thailand –1. –1. 1.9 1. 1. . 8.
Middle East /Africa
Israel –1. –1. . . 8. .1 .
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. 9. . .
South Africa .9 .0 –9. –9. –1.8 . .80
Europe
Czech Republic 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0.1 .8 1. 1.
Euro area 0.9 0.9 –.0 –. . 1. 1.1
Hungary .1 . –.9 –.0 1. 18 1
Norway 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0.1 . .9 .1
Poland . .8 –. –. –1.1 . .
Russia 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. . . .
Sweden –.0 –.9 . . 9.9 . .8
Switzerland –.8 –. 1. 1. 18. 1.09 0.9
Turkey . . –8. –8. –.9 1.1 1.
United Kingdom 1. 1. –.0 –. 1.0 1.9 1.98
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0. 0. –1. –.0 . .1 .01
Brazil 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. .8 1. 1.
Canada 1. 1. –. –. –0. 1.00 1.01
Chile 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. .  9
Colombia 1. 1. –. –.8 –0. 1,90 1,91
Mexico 0.0 0.0 0.0 –0.1 .1 10.8 10.
United States 1. 1. –. –.8 0.0 1.00 1.00
Venezuela 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. . .1 .0
REER = real effective exchange rateN u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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Table 4    Results of simulation with oil producers’ adjustment
Country
Changes in current account
as percent of GDP



















Australia 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. 11. 0.91 1.01
New Zealand 1.1 1. –. –.0 . 0.80 0.8
Asia
China –.9 –.8 1. 1.8 .0 .1 .8
Hong Kong –. –.1 . . 1.1 .80 .
India 0. 0. –.8 –. . 9. .0
Indonesia –1. –1.1 . .8 1. 9,181 ,
Japan 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. 1. 10 9.
Korea 0.9 1.0 –. –. 10. 9 8
Malaysia –.0 –. 10.0 9. . . .
Philippines –0.9 -0.8 . .0 1.0 0. .8
Singapore –1. –1. . .8 9. 1.1 1.01
Taiwan  –.0 –1.9 .8 . 19. 1. .
Thailand –1. –1.1 .9 . 1.9 . .9
Middle East /Africa
Israel –1. –1. .1 .8 9. .1 .0
Saudi Arabia –1. –1. . .0 . . .0
South Africa .0 . –1.1 –1. –. . 8.11
Europe
Czech Republic 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0. .0 1. 1.
Euro area 0.9 1.0 –.1 –.8 1. 1. 1.9
Hungary .1 . –. –. –0. 18 19
Norway –1. –1.1 8. 8. 1.9 .9 .80
Poland . .8 –8.1 –8. –. . .
Russia 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. .0 . .
Sweden –0. –0. .0 1. 8. . .8
Switzerland –. –. 1. 1. .9 1.09 0.8
Turkey . . –1. –1.9 –.0 1.1 1.0
United Kingdom 1. 1. –.1 –. –0. 1.9 1.9
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0. 0. –. –. . .1 .9
Brazil 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0.8 .9 1. 1.
Canada 1. 1. –.9 –.0 –1. 1.00 0.99
Chile 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. .8  8
Colombia 1. 1. –.9 –. –. 1,90 1,8
Mexico 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. 1.9 10.8 10.
United States 1. 1. –. –8. 0.0 1.00 1.00
Venezuela 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. . .1 .00
REER = real effective exchange rateN u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                     J u l y   2 0 0 8
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Table 5    Results of simulation aiming to stabilize NFA/GDP ratios
Changes in current account 
as percent of GDP
Change in REER 



















Australia 1. 1. –. –8. 1.8 0.91 1.0
New Zealand 1. 1. –.9 –. 11. 0.80 0.89
Asia
China –.9 –.8 0.0 19. . .1 .8
Hong Kong  8.8 9.0 –1. –1.9 9. .80 .1
India 1.8 1.9 –1.9 –1. . 9. 8.0
Indonesia –.8 –. 1.9 1. 0. 9,181 ,9
Japan –. –. 19. 18.8 . 10 8.0
Korea –0.9 –0. . .0 . 9 
Malaysia –11.1 –10. . 1. . . .1
Philippines –. –.0 .8 . 8. 0. 1.
Singapore –11.8 –11. . . . 1.1 0.9
Taiwan  –1. –1. .8 . . 1. .0
Thailand –. –.1 . . 8. . .
Middle East /Africa
Israel –. –.1 .0 . 1. .1 .09
Saudi Arabia 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. 19. . .1
South Africa . . –1. –1.0 . . .8
Europe
Czech Republic 0. 0. –1.0 –1. 11. 1. 1.
Euro area 0. 0. –.8 –. 11. 1. 1.
Hungary –1.1 –0.9 . 1.8 1. 18 1
Norway 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. 1.1 .9 .
Poland 1.9 .0 –. –.0 . . .
Russia 0.0 0.1 0.0 –0. 1. . 1.
Sweden –8.0 –.8 . 1.9 . . .
Switzerland –9. –9.1 .0 . .9 1.09 0.9
Turkey . . –8. –9.1 .0 1.1 1.1
United Kingdom .1 . –9.1 –9. .9 1.9 .0
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 0.8 1.1 –. –. 10. .1 .8
Brazil –0.8 –0. . . 1.9 1. 1.8
Canada 0. 0.8 –. –. . 1.00 0.98
Chile 0. 1.0 –. –.1 1.0  1
Colombia 1. 1.8 –8. –9.1 1. 1,90 1,88
Mexico –1.0 –0.9 .8 . 8.0 10.8 10.0
United States . . –1. –1.1 0.0 1.00 1.00
Venezuela 0.0 0. 0.0 –0. 8. .1 1.98N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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those of Australia (8 percent instead of 1 percent) and India 
(14 percent instead of 4 percent). Taiwan has a smaller effec-
tive appreciation (3 percent instead of 9 percent).
 In contrast, several cases of much larger effective appre-
ciations are called for than in the central case. These include 
the  currencies  of  Japan  (19  percent  instead  of  6  percent), 
Malaysia (22 percent instead of 12 percent), Indonesia (13 
percent instead of 3 percent), Sweden (22 percent instead of 
8 percent), and Brazil (4 percent instead of –1 percent). The 
results for Japan and Malaysia indicate that their baseline net 
foreign asset positions, though large, are not large enough to 
warrant the size of projected current account surpluses. 
Supercreditors Singapore and Switzerland turn out to have 
effective appreciations that are relatively close to the central 
case solutions, indicating that not even the need to nourish 
the maintenance of net foreign assets in the range of 120 to 
140 percent of GDP would warrant current account surpluses 
as large as they are projected to run. Taiwan does receive more 
margin to continue large surpluses under the NFA variant, 
as it requires limiting the effective appreciation to 3 percent 
instead of 9 percent to keep net foreign assets as high as 100 
percent of GDP.
Because we do not consider the 2009 levels of net foreign 
assets to have any particular merit as permanent targets, we 
would suggest that these more extreme results should be taken 
with a grain of salt. However, we would underscore that using 
the  alternative  NFA  criterion  leaves  intact  the  qualitative 
pattern of a needed real appreciation in East Asia and depre-
ciation for the United States. In fact, the effective appreciation 
called for would be even greater for Japan, Malaysia, and to a 
lesser extent China, than in the central case, and the effective 
depreciation would be greater for the United States.14
Table 6 shows how strong currencies were in February 
2008 in comparison both with the past and with the values 
implied by the FEER calculation. All of the comparisons are 
ratios in index form, with 100 indicating a ratio of one to 
one. Column (1) shows, for the 24 countries for which the 
IMF publishes data on REERs, how its estimates of the REER 
published  in  International  Financial  Statistics  for  February 
2008 compared with the 10-year average of the same measure 
of the REER. Columns (2) and (3) show how the estimate of 
each currency’s REER made by Citigroup for February 2008 
compares with 10- and 20-year averages. Column (4) is a trans-
formation of column (4) in table 2 and shows the ratio between 
the February 2008 REER and the FEER estimated there using 
the central simulation. This ratio is derived as 100/[(1 + (the 
entry in column (4) of table 2)/100]. For example, column (4) 
14.  Again the sharp exception is the case of Hong Kong, which would switch 
from sizeable appreciation to large depreciation.
shows an index of 109.4 for the US dollar, indicating that in 
February 2008 the dollar was overvalued by 9.4 percent.
If it were true that the past average REER gives a good 
estimate of equilibrium, these figures would be approximately 
equal, differing essentially only because of rounding error. A 
quick glance at the table suffices to establish that this is not 
the case. In some cases it seems that the average REER differed 
markedly from one decade to the next or that the IMF estimate 
differs markedly from that of Citigroup even though both are 
based on the consumer price index (CPI), but in more cases 
there is a big discrepancy between our estimate of the FEER 
and the past average value of the REER. The appendix argues 
that many of those discrepancies seem quite reasonable, espe-
cially in the light of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However, it 
identifies at least one instance (Brazil) in which the estimated 
FEER looks implausible and considers why an erroneous esti-
mate appears to have been made.
Reverting to table 2, column (5) shows the needed chang-
es in the bilateral exchange rate against the dollar in the case of 
the central simulation for each of our 34 currencies. Naturally 
these are generally larger, in many cases much larger, than the 
necessary change in the effective exchange rate. Indeed, there 
are instances (e.g., New Zealand or Korea) where countries 
need a multilateral depreciation but a bilateral appreciation. 
The reason is easy to understand. Because countries trade with 
each other as well as with the United States, many of their 
trading partners will be appreciating as well, so that each of 
them needs a large bilateral appreciation in order to engineer 
a modest multilateral appreciation. This is emphasized by the 
fact that where countries trade principally with the United 
States—like its neighbors, Canada and Mexico—the differ-
ence between bilateral and multilateral exchange rate changes 
is rather modest. Notice also that whereas China needs a much 
larger effective appreciation than what are often called the 
other parts of Greater China, namely Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
the changes in their bilateral exchange rates against the dollar 
We do not see a further appreciation 
of the euro against the dollar as 
appropriate, although we estimate 
that the desirable depreciation of 
the euro on a multilateral basis 
should be effected by a depreciation 
against the Asian currencies 
rather than against the dollar.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7                                                                                                                                                                                     J u l y   2 0 0 8
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Table 6    Effective exchange rates:  Recent rates compared with averages and FEERs, 
                    February 2008
Country
IMF REER





Australia 1.1 1. 1.8 101.
New Zealand 118. 10.1 11. 10.
Asia
China 10.8 10. 9 10.0 8.
Hong Kong n.a. 9.8 8. 9.
India n.a. 10.9 108.0 10.8
Indonesia n.a. 118. 10. 9.
Japan 8. 81. 8. 9.
Korea n.a. 10. 10. 10.
Malaysia 10.1 101. 9.1 89.1
Philippines 1.9 1.1 11. 98.
Singapore 10. 100. 98. 80.
Taiwan n.a. 8. 8. 91.
Thailand n.a. 11. 10.1 98.0
Middle East /Africa
Israel 98. 98.0 9. 9.
Saudi Arabia 8. 8. 8.1 100.
South Africa 88.1 9. 8. 11.1
Europe
Czech Republic 1.0 18. 1. 100.
Euro area 11.1 108.1 10. 10.8
Hungary 119. 11.8 10. 10.1
Norway 108. 10. 10. 100.
Poland 118. 111. 1. 109.
Russia 1.8 1. 1. 100.
Sweden 100. 99. 91.8 9.
Switzerland 98. 9.9 9. 8.
Turkey n.a. 1. 1.1 11.9
United Kingdom 100.1 9.0 9. 10.1
Western Hemisphere
Argentina n.a. . 9.9 10.9
Brazil n.a. 1.8 119. 101.
Canada 1. 1.1 119. 10.
Chile 11. 11.8 11.9 101.1
Colombia 118.9 11.8 1. 108.
Mexico n.a. 98. 10.1 100.
United States 8.8 8.1 90.0 109.
Venezuela 10. 101. 10. 100.8
n.a. = not available
Note: All comparisons are ratios in index form, with 100 indicating a ratio of one to one.
Citigroup REER
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; Citigroup trade-weighted exchange rate index (CTERI) database.N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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would be similar. This is because China is a much more impor-
tant trading partner to Hong Kong and Taiwan than they are 
to China, so that similar changes in bilateral rates translate 
into very different changes in effective rates. 
Column  (6)  shows  purely  historical  data:  the  average 
dollar exchange rate of each currency in February 2008, the 
month that formed the base for the projections in the April 
2008 World Economic Outlook. All data are shown to three 
significant figures. Except in the cases of the Australian and 
New  Zealand  dollars,  the  euro,  and  the  pound  sterling, 
exchange rates are shown as local currency units per dollar.
Column (7) of table 2 shows the estimates of equilib-
rium dollar exchange rates (again to three significant figures, 
although a case can be made for limiting the estimates to 
two significant figures to emphasize that any third figure is 
essentially meaningless, given the margin of error inherent in 
such an exercise) using the central simulation. For example, 
the equilibrium bilateral appreciation of 12.8 percent shown 
for the Australian dollar in column (5) and a February 2008 
rate of A$1 = US$0.91 imply that the equilibrium rate for the 
Australian dollar is A$1 = US$1.02. Most readers will be famil-
iar with a handful of currencies and will naturally examine the 
figures for those currencies to judge whether the results appear 
plausible. However, in doing such an exercise it is important 
to remember that we are undertaking a general equilibrium 
exercise, in which many other currency values are changing 
simultaneously and this ought to exercise a major influence on 
one’s appraisal of a dollar rate. For example, many Europeans 
who believe the euro is already overvalued will be taken aback 
to see the equilibrium dollar-euro rate at about $1.50 = €1; 
but this should be judged in a context where the Asian curren-
cies appreciate against the dollar and the euro, so as to effect 
the multilateral depreciation of the euro indicated to be appro-
priate in column (3) and realized as shown in column (4). 
ConClusion
This policy brief has presented estimates of the current equi-
librium exchange rates of a large number of currencies. The 
general picture is very much like that previously presented in 
policy brief 07-4 (Ahearne et al. 2007): A number of Asian 
currencies, particularly the Chinese renminbi, are seriously 
undervalued and need to appreciate strongly, and this correc-
tion  needs  to  be  accompanied  by  appreciations against  the 
dollar  by  a  number  of  other  currencies—such  as  the  New 
Zealand dollar and the Korean won—that are, if anything, 
already somewhat too strong on a multilateral basis. However, 
these currency moves against the dollar are markedly less than 
was  earlier  portrayed,  because  of  the  dollar’s  strong  depre-
ciation in the intervening year. In particular, we do not see a 
further appreciation of the euro against the dollar as appropri-
ate, although we estimate that the desirable depreciation of the 
euro on a multilateral basis should be effected by a deprecia-
tion against the Asian currencies rather than against the dollar. 
For currencies that need to move a lot, effective appreciations 
would be substantially smaller than bilateral appreciations.
The equilibrium dollar exchange rates of both the Austra-
lian and Canadian dollars have been estimated at about parity 
with the US dollar. Under the scenario presented here, they 
would achieve their multilateral depreciations primarily by the 
Asian appreciations rather than by further movement against 
the US dollar. Any analysis that assumes that Japan has a duty 
to seek a reasonably balanced payments outcome has for years 
yielded the conclusion that the yen needs to appreciate strong-
ly. This is somewhat less true of the present study, but even so 
we estimate an equilibrium bilateral dollar rate of about 90 
yen to the dollar. The equilibrium rate of the renminbi is esti-
mated as about 5.4 in the central simulation, in comparison 
to the present rate of a little under 7. This ought ideally to 
be accompanied by parallel moves by the economies of Greater 
China—Hong Kong and Taiwan—as well as by Malaysia and 
Singapore, while other Asian countries that have little or no 
need for a multilateral appreciation would still need a bilateral 
appreciation against the dollar in order to keep their effective 
rates stable. In most countries except South Africa and Turkey 
that need a multilateral depreciation, this is accomplished large-
ly by the Asian appreciations, although in these two cases and 
to a lesser extent in Poland some depreciation against the dollar 
is also called for. The pound sterling is an example of a currency 
that needs an effective depreciation (in addition to its recent 
pronounced fall against its major trading partner, the euro area) 
that  should  be  accomplished  largely  by  Asian  strengthening 
rather than a depreciation against the dollar. The equilibrium 
value of the Swiss franc is estimated at well over a dollar.
In the central scenario we made no attempt to estimate the 
equilibrium exchange rates of the currencies of the oil export-
ers. These were already projected to run a massive $292 billion 
surplus in 2009 on the basis of an assumed oil price of $95 
per barrel (the assumption in the April 2008 World Economic 
Outlook),  and  the  figure  is  presumably  substantially  larger 
by now in the light of the further increase in oil prices since 
February. Our decision not to target a current account change 
by these countries is based on several considerations. The IMF 
has concluded that in the past most of the oil-exporting coun-
tries always ultimately adjusted to an oil price increase, though 
the pace may have been somewhat lethargic, and it believes 
that this time around current accounts may adjust even more 
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before, we are strongly in favor of their shifting from a bilateral 
peg to the dollar (in most cases) to either a managed float or 
a peg to a basket that includes oil, on the grounds that this 
would accelerate adjustment and make it less traumatic. But 
it is quite different to argue that they should manage their 
exchange rates so as to contribute to adjustment. A FEER is 
intended to be a sustainable equilibrium rate that maximizes 
the utility of a country’s residents, not a rate that disrupts opti-
mal saving plans in pursuit of an arbitrary rule. Some of the 
oil exporters—especially those with large oil sales relative to 
domestic investment opportunities, like Norway, Kuwait, and 
the United Arab Emirates—are deliberately accumulating some 
of their oil revenues in the form of sovereign wealth funds as 
part of a program of optimal saving. Short-run current account 
targeting would disrupt this program, while long-run targeting 
is, according to the IMF analysis, unnecessary. It is simpler to 
leave the oil-exporting countries alone and to recognize that 
the oil surplus will wax or wane depending on how much 
time has elapsed since the last oil price increase or decline. The 
analysis on which we have focused is the problem of securing 
adjustment within the group of oil-importing countries.
Nevertheless,  because  some  people  believe  that  the  oil 
producers should not be allowed to “get away” with something, 
we have also calculated a simulation in which the oil exporters 
in our model were subjected to similar rules as other countries. 
Even making a very generous elasticity assumption, this simu-
lation suggests that Saudi Arabia should revalue by 47 percent 
and Norway by 38 percent. Although these appreciations are 
probably greatly underestimated as a result of the generous elas-
ticity assumption, they would be similar in magnitude to those 
that would have resulted if these oil producers had pegged in 
2000 to a basket with a 10 percent oil weight.
We have also calculated simulations for two other vari-
ants of the basic model. One assumed the elasticities to be 
higher than in the central case, on the ground that the result-
ing simulation implies a smaller increase in the world current 
account discrepancy. The other, inspired by the IMF, asked 
what exchange rate would stabilize the ratio of NFA/GDP at its 
2009 level. This does not in general seem to us to be a sensible 
policy objective, but it does have the merit of exposing when 
countries are indulging in Ponzi-like behavior.
The  basic  features  illuminated  by  this  analysis  remain 
unchanged in the variants. It is still true that the dollar remains 
somewhat overvalued on a multilateral basis; that the Chinese 
renminbi is strongly undervalued multilaterally and bilater-
ally; that the euro is now overvalued multilaterally but is not 
significantly, if at all, overvalued against the dollar; and that 
the undervaluation of the yen remains but is much less than 
at one time.
Appendix   
evAluATion of The feeR esTimATes
This  appendix  examines  the  plausibility  of  the  FEERs  esti-
mated in this policy brief. The figures given in table 6 permit a 
direct comparison of our estimates of how strong each currency 
was in February 2008 in relation to its FEER, given in the last 
column, with estimates of how strong each currency then was 
in comparison to its historical average (given in the first three 
columns). All of the ratios in the table are shown in index form, 
with 100 indicating a ratio of unity. It turns out that in several 
instances, developing or rapidly growing industrial countries 
have FEERs that exceed the average REER of the past decade, 
and often it will be the case that a plausible explanation is 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This effect reflects more rapid 
productivity growth in the export sector than in the nontrad-
ables sector, causing the exchange rate that is in equilibrium 
from the standpoint of trade to rise over time relative to the 
exchange rate predicted by purchasing power parity across both 
traded and nontraded goods. Nonetheless, a plausible range for 
this effect for a period as short as five years, the distance away 
from the midpoint of two of the historical levels shown in the 
table, would likely be modest, perhaps on the order of 5 to 10 
percent.
Pacific
In the case of Australia, any overvaluation of the Australian 
dollar  is  modest  compared  with  the  extent  to  which  the 
currency is strong relative to its past values. This seems entirely 
plausible in view of Australia’s prominent role as an exporter of 
primary products and the recent strength of primary product 
prices. Assuming that one expects primary product prices to 
remain relatively strong in the future, as we do, the FEER of 
the Australian dollar can be expected to remain strong. 
The  same  is  true  of  New  Zealand,  though  in  smaller 
measure. Significantly less than one half of the New Zealand 
dollar’s strength relative to its past average can be explained 
by overvaluation. The remainder should be attributed to the 
current and likely future strength in primary product prices.
Asia
We estimate the Chinese renminbi to be substantially under-
valued (by at least 15 percent on a multilateral basis), whereas 
the other figures already show it to be stronger than its medi-
um-run average. In view of the vast Chinese current account 
surplus, which cannot conceivably be justified as an optimal N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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use of resources by China, we regard this as demonstrating the 
superiority of an analytical over a purely historical approach to 
the analysis of equilibrium exchange rates. Clearly, the figures 
imply that the equilibrium Chinese exchange rate has appreci-
ated strongly in recent years. In view of China’s emergence as 
a market economy, it is not altogether surprising that there is 
limited value in past figures on average exchange rates. One also 
expects to find strong Balassa-Samuelson appreciation in the 
equilibrium rate. The undervaluation is even more pronounced 
using the criterion of stabilizing NFA/GDP.
The real effective exchange rate of the Hong Kong dollar 
is much weaker than before, since the nominal rate has been 
dragged down by the weakness of the US dollar and the persis-
tence of Hong Kong authorities in maintaining an inappropri-
ate fixed bilateral exchange rate. Our estimate is that Hong 
Kong is indeed in need of a revaluation, though one more 
modest than the historical experience would suggest. Even if 
no Balassa-Samuelson effect has been operative in the case of 
Hong Kong, the fact that our analysis shows historical deprecia-
tion in the equilibrium exchange rate stands in wait of a ready 
explanation.
The Indian rupee appears close to equilibrium, with possi-
bly a mild overvaluation. We would surmise that the Balassa-
Samuelson effect is weak because India is only now reaching 
the stage at which one expects the effect to operate. 
The  Indonesian  rupiah  is  currently  very  strong  relative 
to its past average, but we nevertheless estimate it to be, if 
anything, slightly undervalued. This might be partly explained 
by a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect.
The  Japanese  yen  is  exceptionally  weak  relative  to  past 
values. Our analysis confirms that it is undervalued, but we also 
regard it as appropriate that it should be weaker than a simple 
extrapolation of historical experience. As is well known, the 
Japanese economy has not functioned well in recent years, and 
one consequence has presumably been a reduction in Japanese 
competitiveness  at  constant  prices  and  exchange  rates.  Our 
figures suggest that a relatively modest multilateral revaluation 
of the yen would suffice to take it to its FEER. The size of the 
corresponding revaluation in the bilateral exchange rate against 
the dollar is considerably larger than that of the effective rate, 
however, because of the large trade weight of China and other 
East  Asian  economies  whose  REERs  rise  substantially  in  a 
general realignment to FEERs.
The Korean won appears close to equilibrium. If anything, 
it is mildly overvalued. 
The  Malaysian  ringgit  is  on  our  measure  substantially 
undervalued. It is nevertheless not particularly weak relative to 
its past average over the last decade on either the IMF or the 
Citigroup measures; one has to go back to before the Asian crisis 
to find a period in which the ringgit was reasonably valued. 
The Philippine peso is much stronger than it used to be, but 
our analysis does not suggest that it is overvalued. Presumably 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect is at work.
The Singapore dollar’s present value is broadly in line with 
its  past  value,  which  is  not  surprising  since  the  Monetary 
Authority of Singapore aims to stabilize its value in terms of 
a basket. However, we estimate a very large undervaluation. 
That is because Singapore has a large published current account 
surplus, which has cumulated into a large stock of NFAs. Despite 
this, it continues to show a deficit on investment income. We 
would not be entirely surprised if the figures were revised in a 
way that reduced the measured need for appreciation. 
Our analysis suggests that the New Taiwan dollar is under-
valued to a similar extent as the Hong Kong dollar. (The analy-
sis of bilateral exchange rates suggests that mainland China 
and both these constituents of Greater China need to revalue 
against the dollar to a roughly similar extent.) 
The Thai baht is estimated to be near equilibrium, having 
apparently returned to the vicinity of its level before the Asian 
crisis. One may suspect it was then somewhat overvalued; the 
views are consistent if a Balassa-Samuelson effect has been at 
work.
Middle East/Africa
In the case of Israel we do not find a big disequilibrium, though 
there is some evidence of a mild undervaluation of the shekel.
In the central simulation we have not attempted to esti-
mate equilibrium exchange rates for oil producers like Saudi 
Arabia. The first three columns of table 6 show that the Saudi 
riyal is currently very weak, a result of pegging to the US dollar 
in a period when the latter has been weak.
 South Africa presents a conundrum. Both the IMF and 
Citigroup view the rand as weak relative to the past, but our 
calculations suggest that it is not nearly weak enough to be 
consistent with a reasonable current account. It is difficult to 
imagine that South Africa will in the future achieve a satisfac-
tory current account except with a rand weaker than in the 
past.
Europe
The Czech crown is estimated as near equilibrium, despite being 
much stronger than in the past. One assumes that the successful 
transition to a market economy and the strong Balassa-Samuel-
son effect that has operated in Central and Eastern Europe are 
collectively responsible.
The euro is shown as strong relative to its past average on 
all three measures and also as somewhat overvalued by our esti-
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about the recent strength of the euro. However, as noted in 
the main text, a euro depreciation needs to be accomplished 
vis-à-vis the Asian currencies rather than the dollar, if it is to 
promote the adjustment process.
The  Hungarian  forint  is  somewhat  overvalued  but  by 
much less than history would suggest, presumably for the same 
reasons described regarding the Czech crown. 
The Norwegian krone is currently somewhat strong relative 
to its past values. We have not attempted to estimate a FEER 
for the krone in the central case.
The Polish zloty is more overvalued than the Hungarian 
forint according to our estimates, though—like other regional 
currencies—it is less overvalued than historical comparisons 
might suggest.
The figures for Russia show that the ruble is now very strong 
relative to its past average. We have not aimed to produce a 
FEER for the ruble in the central case.
The Swedish krona is close to its average of the past 10 
years. Sweden nonetheless has a big current account surplus, 
and our estimate is that the krona is correspondingly under-
valued. This is consistent with the weakness of the krona in a 
longer historical perspective.
All estimates agree that the Swiss franc is currently under-
valued, though our estimate is substantially larger than the 
extent  to  which  the  Swiss  franc  currently  falls  short  of  its 
historical average. This is presumably because (like in Singa-
pore) the country has been in substantial surplus for many 
years. While allowing a larger than normal surplus (6 percent 
of GDP instead of the regular 3 percent, close to what can 
be justified by abnormalities in the Swiss overseas investment 
position), our method limits this excess surplus.
The Turkish lira is shown as distinctly overvalued, though 
by less than the extent to which it is stronger than its past aver-
age. This suggests a strong Balassa-Samuelson effect.
There is a curious conflict, which we are in no position to 
resolve, regarding the strength of the United Kingdom’s pound 
sterling relative to the past. The IMF reckons that the pound is 
almost exactly equal to its past average, whereas Citigroup puts 
it distinctly weaker. Our FEER suggests that in any event it 
needs to depreciate somewhat more. (In terms of the euro, the 
currency of the United Kingdom’s main trading partner, the 
FEER-equivalent exchange rate is €1.30.)
Western Hemisphere
The Argentine peso is currently very weak by historical standards, 
but we nonetheless calculate it to be marginally overvalued. 
Presumably the major explanation is to be found in the very 
heavy export taxes on most agricultural products, which are 
assumed as part of the data that produce an estimate of over-
valuation but are not reflected in calculations of the current 
value of the exchange rate relative to past values. 
The Brazilian real is currently very strong by historical stan-
dards. In contrast, we estimate only a marginal overvaluation. 
A part of the explanation is again to be found in Brazil’s role 
as a major exporter of primary products (about half its export 
value comes from the primary sector). But Brazil ran a current 
account deficit of $14 billion in the first four months of 2008, 
against the IMF projection of an $11 billion deficit for the 
entire year, despite the strength of primary product prices. Its 
deficit is already running at a higher rate than during the over-
valuation of the 1990s. Hence this is one case in which we are 
skeptical of the IMF projection used in estimating the FEERs, 
which shows the current account deficit remaining at less than 
1 percent of GDP, and believe that a more realistic forecast of 
what is likely at current exchange rates would have led to a 
significant less highly valued FEER and bigger overvaluation. 
The Canadian dollar is currently strong by historical stan-
dards. We nonetheless calculate it to be at most only marginally 
overvalued. The explanation again is the current and probable 
future strength of primary product prices (including energy), 
of which Canada is a significant net exporter. Doubtless this 
is reinforced by the improvement in Canada’s international 
debt position.
The Chilean peso is currently strong by historical stan-
dards, but it was kept deliberately weak in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s in the pursuit of export-led growth. We 
estimate that it is currently very close to equilibrium. This 
seems entirely reasonable in the light of the prospective price 
of copper, Chile’s main primary product export.
The Colombian peso is strong relative to its past average. 
We also estimate it to be significantly overvalued, although not 
to the same extent as its strength relative to the past. Perhaps 
this is because a majority of its exports consist either of energy 
or other primary products.
The figures for the United States show the dollar to be 
weak  relative  to  its  past  average.  We  nonetheless  estimate 
that a further decline in its value will be needed to restore 
equilibrium, even defining equilibrium to be a 3 percent of 
GDP deficit in the current account. The major explanation 
is presumably that the dollar has been overstrong for many 
years (as a result of which the United States has changed from 
the world’s largest net creditor to its largest debtor), a disequi-
librium that our method assumes needs to be reduced to a 
prudent level. 
The  Venezuelan  bolivar  does  not  seem  to  be  especially 
out of line by the standards of the past ten years, though it is 
strong on a longer historical perspective. Since the bolivar is 
an oil currency, we have not estimated its FEER in the central 
case. N u m b e r   Pb0 8 - 7     J u l y  2 0 0 8
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